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1Biodiversity Conservation in Melanesia: Addressing Risk
and Uncertainty Among Stakeholders
The lowland rainforests of Melanesia have attracted the interest of those who produce and trade in
global commodities.  Tropical timbers are a valuable resource and are in strong demand in their raw
form in East and South-east Asia and in their manufactured forms throughout the world.  The
exploitation of this resource has come rather later in Melanesia than in other tropical countries of
the South-east Asian region for a number of reasons.  Among these are the lower density of
commercial species in comparison with forests in other places in South-east Asia (Nectoux &
Kuroda, 1989), doubtful political stability, insufficiently skilled labour force, lack of infrastructure,
high comparative wage costs, cultural behaviours at odds with commercial exploitation, and
insecure legal tenure of the forest resource or State inability to enforce tenure.
The biodiversity values of these lowland rainforest areas are regarded as very high by a wide range
of interested parties ranging from ecologists and biologists to people holding general
conservationist and preservationist attitudes.  Other values pertaining to economics, potential
genetic knowledge, water resources, cultural and sociological issues for local forest dwellers,
subsistence food supplies etc., are held at various levels of commitment by a variety of other
groups.  Attempts to manage the forest resource has resulted in a variety of schemes one of which
involves Integrated Conservation and Development Projects (ICADPs).  This paper briefly
examines the ways in which the players/stakeholders in one of these ICADPs in Papua New
Guinea perceive and act upon risk and uncertainty .  While the author’s observation and research is
the source of the information in the case of this ICADP, other ICADPs are mentioned in a
comparative sense with the information based on some personal observations but mostly on the
writings of people intimately involved in their facilitation.
The Integrated Conservation and Development Project at Kamiali is activated by the local
landowners in partnership with an indigenous NGO, The Village Development Trust.  External
help has been sought, mostly for financial aid but including some technical assistance, from a
variety of offshore donors and a couple of government departments.  The major stakeholders
examined in this paper are the indigenous landowners (the Kamiali people), the facilitating Non-
Government Organisation (the Village Development Trust), and the external donors (Interchurch
Organisation for Development Co-operation – ICCO, World Wildlife Fund – WWF, New Zealand
and Australian High Commissions and the Rainforest Information Centre being the major ones).
Other groups also have a stake in this development but in a minor way by comparison with those
mentioned above e.g. National and Provincial governments, adjoining landowning communities.
Background
The Kamiali
The author has used the name Kamiali for the group of Kela speaking people from a cluster of five
hamlets around Nasau Bay (about 60-80 km south-east of Lae).  These people identify themselves
as a single community and operate as one.  For that reason they will be referred to as a village in the
following discussion. The Kamiali first came to the attention of the author in 1993 when they were
cited as belonging to one of four villages involved in what was then known as the Lasanga Island-
Lake Trist Conservation Project.  This was a paper proposal put forward by the Village
Development Trust and the people of the villages of Kui, Buso, Siboma and Lababia (Kamiali) to
the World Wildlife Fund for the preservation of a large area of approximately 250,000 ha. at risk
from large-scale logging in return for assistance with environmentally-sensitive development
projects. Since that time the lack of a consensus among the villages and between clans in the
villages has resulted in the abandonment of the original conception with only the people of Kamiali
retaining their commitment.  The final outcome has been the formation of an Integrated
Conservation and Development Project centered on Kamiali and the declaration of a Wildlife
2Management Area (WMA) of 47,413 ha. on August 6, 19961.  The Wildlife Management Area
constitutes all but 3,300 ha. of the land area claimed by the Kamiali.  This latter area lies to the
north of the WMA and is the home of the Kaiwa people of Salus.
A comprehensive description of the Kamiali and their society can be found elsewhere (see Martin,
1999) but in brief they divide themselves into two major groups (clans) called the Areme and the
Gara, each of which has six lines or families (sub-clans).  They are gardeners and fisherfolk and, in
general, their activities are confined to a narrow coastal strip and the deltas of the Bitoi and Tabali
rivers.  Hunting is an activity confined to a small group of men with dogs but this is a minor activity
and little food is derived from this source.
The Village Development Trust
With the backing of the Foundation of the Peoples of the South Pacific, VDT was begun in 1990
with the following central elements as defined by its mission statement:
• Empowering and supporting village communities to manage their resources in ways that promote self-reliance and that are
environmentally, economically and socially sustainable. (Village Development Trust, 1998)
To achieve this the goals of the Trust are to:
• Promote sustainable livelihoods for village people
• Develop appropriate technologies for village use
• Improve the utilisation of village resources
• Promote environmental issues
• Train villagers and extension personnel
• Establish and maintain environmentally acceptable standards for marketable natural resources
• Develop village level skills (Farley et al, 1993).
The Village Development Trust (VDT) has undergone considerable expansion in the ten years of
its existence to 2000 from two foresters concerned with the training of potential small-scale
sawmillers in forest management and the operation of portable milling machines, to a staff of nine
including foresters, financial and development planning managers, a women’s affairs officer, project
managers and office workers.  The Trust has a number of projects and areas of interest in which it
has contributed its growing skills.  These can be grouped into two main areas, the Morobe Eco-
timber Producers Group and the Kamiali ICADP.  VDT is governed by a Board of Directors
consisting of local indigenous businessmen and landowners, the executive director of another
national NGO and a scientist.
It is only in relatively recent times that the Trust has shifted from providing training for individual
operators of portable sawmills, and raising the awareness of these operators and village people
along the south-east Morobe coast, to environmental issues.  This expansion has coincided with the
growing skills’ capacity of the Trust and its ability to raise significant amounts of funding from a
variety of external sources. The expansion has taken the form of attempting to create a small-scale
eco-timber industry, with its centre in Lae, consisting of a collection and resawing facility, advice
from foresters employed by the Village Development Trust, access to finance, access to ‘green’
export markets and assistance in the formation of an ICADP at Kamiali.
The Location
A major factor in gaining the assistance of external donors with a conservation mission is the
potential of the area for preservation of its biodiversity and the value such donors and the local
people place on that biodiversity.  Western biological knowledge of the Kamiali area, and for a
                                                     
1 29,285 ha. is terrestrial and 18,128 ha. marine, including Lababia, Jawani and Battaru islands (National Gazette, No. G77 - Sept.
19, 1996)
3significant distance to the south, is limited.  The Conservation Needs Assessment of 1993 is
extremely brief in its description referring only to an ultrabasic montane flora, plus coastal,
mangrove and seagrass communities that are botanically unusual and virtually unsurveyed (Beehler,
1993).  Also, the Kuper Range, to the south of Kamiali, is virtually uninhabited by humans.   The
coast and seas off Kamiali are considered of high priority in marine biodiversity with their reefs, sea
walls, mangroves and Leatherback and Green turtle nesting beaches.  The reefs, islands and sea life
of this area are affected by the drainage of the upland regions through the many rivers of the region
and for this reason the area has also earned a classification as a critical watershed.  The lack of
knowledge of the flora and fauna of the area may have a role to play in the designation of ‘high’ and
‘very high’ priority for biodiversity conservation but the combination of the above characteristics




Local landowners will attempt to exploit economic opportunities as they arise.  They are as
interested as anyone else in improving their quality of life and see modern (Western) consumer
goods, services and lifestyles as adding to that quality.  Their particular social context qualifies the
way in which they go about exploiting economic opportunities.  For instance, the accumulation of
prestige (particularly by men) is highly valued and competition for prestige in a village setting
influences relationships between stakeholders in the management and development of projects.
Within a local landowner group this competition can take the form of disputation between villages
or, as in the case of a single village, different ‘lines’ or subclans will compete, especially if threats to
the village as a whole are not recognised.
Entering into agreement with outsiders to establish an Integrated Conservation and Development
Project can be driven in whole or part by an effort to increase security over land.  For example, the
establishment of Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs), often an outcome of such agreements, can
be seen as legitimising a land claim.  Van Helden (1998) records such a case in the anxiety of Ramu
valley people at the immigration of Jimi valley settlers in their region in the Bismarck-Ramu
ICADP.  Both the Gimi and Pawaian people in the Crater Mountain ICADP see value in securing
claims to land through the establishment of WMAs (Johnson, 1997; Pearl, 1994).  The Kamiali have
already had a WMA gazetted but groups on the Western and Southern borders are beginning to
question its boundaries.
While it is rare, the agenda of a land owning group can involve the conservation of natural forest (in
addition to the land on which the forest is found).  Van Helden (1998) notes that the Sepu clans on
the Ramu River are anxious to preserve cultural identity in the midst of immigration from the Jimi
valley and an influx of loggers and miners and that identity is linked to their environment.  Reports
also exist of the rejection, by the Maisin people of Collingwood Bay in Oro Province, of offers of
logging at least partly motivated by a concern to preserve sacred sites (Martin, 1999).
The facilitator of the ICADP
There are a variety of facilitators of ICADPs in Papua New Guinea and each of them has its own
mission.  These missions will contain elements of ‘development’ and ‘conservation’ in various
mixes.  For instance, there may be a central focus of conservation with an understanding that
without meeting the needs/wants of local inhabitants little progress will be made.  On the other
hand development may be the central focus with an understanding that this must be sustainable and
therefore related to environmental protection, especially if donor funds are dependent on the latter.
Sometimes the facilitator is a partnership between a local NGO and an international conservation
group, sometimes the facilitation is directly through the international conservation group.
However, most of the ICADPs in Papua New Guinea have an indigenous NGO providing this
facilitation.  This is the case for the Kamiali ICADP where the Village Development Trust carries
out this role.
4The general mission of the Village Development Trust has been pointed out earlier but it is
important to recognise that there are other elements in its agenda that do not appear in its stated
objectives.  This is the case of other NGOs as well.  For instance, the Village Development Trust
has a long-term goal of making itself self-sufficient in its core funding through selling its services as
a trainer and perhaps middleman for a small-scale, community-based forestry industry.  Its medium
term goal is to cover its costs through external donor funding.  These institutional maintenance
goals are essential for the realisation of its mission and are to be lauded.  However, there is another
aspect of this that bears upon the way risk assessment is viewed.  The NGOs are an alternative
career path for professionals in a country where opportunities are limited.  The survival of the
institution is essential to the work aspirations of a number of talented individuals.
NGOs will often have a dominant individual operating as CEO and influencing the Board of
Directors in the policy direction of the institution.  This is particularly true of small NGOs or
recently formed ones.  The agenda of such individuals can be localised with personal interests in a
tribal area influencing policy formation and consequently the manner of risk assessment.  It is the
author’s observation that the influence of such individuals decreases as the institution grows in size
and its skills base expands.  This is evident in a broadening of its interests and in collective policy
development.
External donors
Generally an ICADP will have a strong association with a single international donor e.g.
Greenpeace in the case of Collingwood Bay, Conservation International at Crater Mountain,
UNDP/DEC at Lak.  It can be said that the central mission of each of these has been conservation
of an undisturbed environment.  The Kamiali ICADP is something of an exception in that the
facilitator has followed a different path in finding its funding from a variety of sources, many of
which have had development as their central mission.  Initially this was not the case as limited
financial backing come by way of the World Wildlife Fund and the Rainforest Information Centre
in respect of the Lake Trist – Lasanga Island Conservation Project, the forerunner of the Kamiali
ICADP (much reduced in size from the original conception).  However, as time progressed many
sources of funding were tapped.
The donor agencies external to Papua New Guinea divide themselves into two groups according to
their orientations to conservation and development.  The first of these, which include government
agencies, the United Nations Development Program, private foundations and Church groups,
exhibit a focus on specific outcomes involving material improvements to people’s lives in the way
they deal with applications for funding.  Improving the capacity of NGOs to carry out a facilitating
function in their interface with local groups, specific training of local people and the provision of
the means to increase village incomes tend to gain most support.   Conservation is often seen as a
valuable adjunct to the activities that are being funded.  Relations between this group and the
NGOs were generally good with a high degree of agreement between their goals and
implementation processes.
The second group of external agencies have a conservation focus in common i.e. their mission
statements have a primary focus on preserving ecological integrity.  Improvement in the quality of
rural villagers’ lives is seen as a means to this end.  It is with this group that the author observed
differences emerging with the Village Development Trust.   Because of the focus of this second
donor group, submissions for aid from the NGO are centred around the conservation outcomes
expected. The groups with a conservation mission are often, but not always, conduits for
government aid and the submissions to government from the conservation organisation may
sometimes place emphasis on development rather than environmental issues in order to meet the
perceived requirements of the government agency concerned.  Confusion can arise when the
external donor applies somewhat more stringent environmental scrutiny to its audits of the
facilitating organisation than its own submissions to government agencies suggest is warranted.
5Stakeholder Risks
In discussing the way risk is assessed and acted on in the establishment of the partnerships involved
in setting up an Integrated Conservation and Development Project, the author will point to
differing aspects of perception about relationships among the players/stakeholders. Territorial
relationships are exhibited in the social bonds established in local history and particular bio-physical
environments.  A temporal aspect accompanies the spatial orientation of these territorial
relationships.  Local needs, wants and behaviours are time-dependent in the sense that they are
influenced by culture, that evolved set of beliefs or way of interpreting the world, which is
established over time and by the fact that future generations have a claim on the local area.  That
localised spatial/temporal dimension incorporates socio-political, economic, cultural and
intergenerational content.
Development viewed from a functional perspective can look quite different from that of a
territorial one (a functional perspective is one in which people are linked or related by purpose or
function rather than by the space or territory they occupy).  For example, significant cultural change
or dislocation at the local level may barely be visible from a national, functional perspective.
Logging and mining companies have goals and structures located in function, long-term temporal
frameworks and national and international linkages.  They interact with local, rural people whose
goals and structures are located in their social relationships and in Papua New Guinea’s case,
centered on short-term cycles.  This interaction raises specific problems in both development and
conservation areas.
Rural communities in Papua New Guinea are characterised by territorial relationships in contrast
with the functional forms of commercial and industrial forces, development agencies, international
conservation groups and regional and national government.  While both forms are present in any
society or organisation there are aspects of their social integration which place them towards
opposite ends of a continuum.  Hettne (1995) compares territorialism and functionalism with
distinctive types of social organisation such as Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft.  Functional relationships
are founded in mutual self-interest and pyramidal power structures lacking spatial relevance and
characterised by relations between individuals rather than being group-oriented (Friedmann &
Weaver, 1979).  As a consequence, integration of functional ‘committees’ with the biophysical
environment is difficult and mutual self-interest leads to “segmentation rather than the integration
of human populations” (Ife, 1995:92).
Local landowners
When forming partnerships with a facilitator and with donor organisations local landholders are in
the business of assessing risk in a number of areas; economic, social and cultural.  For instance,
there is the possibility that an economic opportunity will be foregone.  This is particularly relevant
in lowland forest areas of Papua New Guinea similar to that around Nasau Bay occupied by the
Kamiali.  The forest may be in demand from logging companies or significant areas of forested land
by mining companies.  The short-term financial return from selling resources to these companies
has to be assessed against longer-term returns from conserving natural resources and involving
themselves in ‘new’ forms of business for which there are no obvious models available.
The security inherent in kinship linkages can be seen as being at risk as cash generating options are
proposed in terms of small-scale, individual or nuclear-family owned business.  The functional
linkages required are often at odds with the way people have related in the past (the change in
relationships is frequently not recognised until actually experienced).  When the potential for such
change is recognised it may be assessed against an offer from a logging or mining company offering
financial returns into a fund actually or theoretically owned by the whole community.  Individuals
may see the opportunities for prestige gains either diminished or foregone.  This is particularly the
case where prestige creating relationships are seen in territorial terms and change requires prestige
to be delivered via functional means.  Finally, there is a fear that the community will be used by
outsiders for their own benefit and to the disadvantage of the community.  This is a ‘logical’
supposition for those viewing the world through a territorial perspective rather than a functional
6one (see Martin, 1999 for a more detailed examination of the attitudes and worldviews of
stakeholders).
Facilitator
Despite the indigenous background of the staff of a facilitating NGO, risk assessment lies much
more in the functional arena than in a territorial one.  If the advocacy of the organisation is not
pitched in such a way as to appeal to potential donors then the existence of the organisation may be
compromised (and thus the careers of many who have chosen NGO service as an alternative to the
public service).  If the mission of the organisation is too dissimilar to that of potential funding
agencies then the organisation may find its existence precarious, or be faced with compromising
that mission in its submissions for funding.  For instance, if it is appealing to a conservation agency
interested in biodiversity preservation then it will be under pressure to ensure its project fits the
functional orientation of that agency, which may take the form of ensuring an area of a particular
size is preserved given ecosystem requirements.  This may directly cut across the territorial
requirements of the landowners in the area.  There are a number of examples of such conflict in
Papua New Guinea e.g. Lak and Lasanga Island-Lake Trist conservation projects.
In addition to concerns about meeting the general outcomes expected by the donor agencies there
are concerns associated with ‘process’ policies of those agencies.  For example, the notions of
participatory behaviours and those of equity can be different for donor organisation and those of
the landholders.  Donor organisations may make equitable distribution a condition for assistance
when the success of small-scale business is optimised by ownership and management residing in the
hands of a single family group or sub-clan.  Many development professionals working in Melanesia
and interviewed by the author were critical of the lack of success, due mainly to interclan or
individual rivalry, of business ventures in which whole communities were the owners.
Facilitation may involve the NGO being directly involved in a business partnership with local
landholders as the only realistic method of achieving its goals.  Apart from potential conflicts of
interest, there are problems for the NGO in ensuring functional chains are constructed to ensure
viability of the business.  The eco-forestry business promoted by the Village Development Trust is
a case in point.  There the NGO must balance competing territorial perspectives of the landholder
harvesters with the functional requirements of a production and marketing chain (Martin, 1997).
Each of the perceived elements of risk referred to above in regard to the facilitator of the ICADP
can be seen as pressure to operate in a functional way and the author is of the opinion that this is,
in fact, how the perspective of the facilitator develops.  However, in some cases individuals
exercising power within an NGO will perceive risk to personal prestige opportunities in facilitating
a project if it takes time and opportunities away from their local kingroups.  This has been observed
where the NGO is relatively localised but is in a growth period with its general skills and interests
expanding.  Conflict can often eventuate in such circumstances.
External Donors
External donors face the risk of their essential missions being compromised e.g. in the case of a
conservation oriented organisation that viable ecosystem preservation is not the outcome of their
expenditure of resources or, in the case of a development oriented organisation, that economic
improvement is diminished by conservation measures being given too high a priority (in their
opinion).  These are functional concepts as also is the accountability of these external donors to
their membership/contributors.  That accountability will be both financial, in terms of measurable
outcomes in line with the mission statements of the organisation, and in what the
membership/contributors see as appropriate social behaviours exhibited by those they are
providing support for e.g. in respect of such things as participatory strategies and social equity.
Risk Minimisation Behaviours
An issue has been made of the functional and territorial orientations of stakeholders because it is
the view of the author that these are influential in the decisions they make when strategies are being
7determined for involvement in Integrated Conservation and Development Projects.  Minimising
risk is always an essential element in the determination of strategies.
External Donors
When auditing submissions for financial and/or technical aid, donor agencies are seeking outcomes
stated in terms consistent with their mission, consistent with what is known of the necessary and
sufficient conditions for ecosystem viability, and development strategies which have shown a
success rate elsewhere (success being defined within the context of the culture of the donor
organisation).  In minimising risk by accommodating the demands of its membership/contributors
it is seeking clearly measurable outcomes in relatively short timelines.  Other aspects of the donor
organisation culture may demand the presentation of strategies consistent with ideas of
participation of those the aid is designated to help and with social equity.  However, the later
‘processes’ are difficult to measure and thus tend not to receive an equal measure of attention with
material outcomes in the subsequent audits.
Facilitators
For the facilitator the risk is that a submission will not measure up to the requirements of donor
organisations and thus put its existence, its mission, and the careers of its staff in jeopardy.  In
attempting to reduce this risk its submissions (usually on behalf of landowner groups but including
core funding for its own maintenance) tend to specify material outcomes and timelines rather than
process and attitudinal change.  Project tracking and measurement proposals tend to favour what is
easily measurable and influence stated outcomes.  The partnerships the facilitator has forged with
local landowner groups does not ameliorate this approach but in fact may reinforce it as the
landowners see outcomes in material ways.  Similarly, the strategies employed emphasize functional
relationships as these are perceived, correctly in the author’s view, to satisfy the requirements and
orientation of potential donors.
The pressures on the facilitator shape its behaviours along functional lines.  This leads to conflict
with the territorial orientation of its local project partners in many situations (see Martin, 1999 for
examples of how these conflicts develop and for the context in which resolution is sought).
Landowner groups
The problem for individuals and extended family groups (sub-clans) is to ensure they make the
most of the opportunities available in any partnership/project.  This means their immediate kinship
group is represented on all committees, action groups etc. and in a position to take advantage of
any situations likely to benefit the family group or enhance the prestige of the individual
representative.  The outcome of this apparent risk minimisation behaviour is competition between
kingroups and aspiring individuals often to the detriment of the community group as a whole
(although it would not be seen in this light by the players).  Functional aspects take second place to
territorial/kingroup considerations.  Distrust and jealousy are extremely common outcomes.
Leadership tends to be sectional and tightly localised.  Individual leaders have a need to gain
followers among near or extended kingroups rather than from a broader constituency in the first
instance.  When disparate group representatives (leaders or prospective leaders) are brought
together, the outcome is that of competition rather than cooperation.  The internal politics of a
community is often masked or opaque to their partners in a project and to external observers.  This
is due as much to the culture of the facilitator and external donor groups as it is to any deliberate
efforts on the part of the local community to mask their differences.
External groups view their interaction with their local partners through their own cultural filters.
For instance, the chairman of a local committee is assumed to be a leader in his (rarely her) local
community and to speak for the committee.  This is often not the case as the local spokesperson
may be an aspiring leader and presenting his own agenda in the hope of stealing a march on rivals.
The local community and the real leaders, who tend not to risk their own reputations in direct
interaction with outsiders, at least in the early stages, allow the aspiring young men to test
themselves and only step in when an obvious threat to their community eventuates. This has the
effect, in the eyes of the traditional leaders, of minimising the risk to community opportunities and
their own prestige while allowing for a denial of responsibility if things go wrong in the interaction
8between spokesmen and external partners.  The high risk takers are the men aspiring to prestige and
leadership and who expose their competence and skills to their peers as they interface with
‘outsiders’. While this observation cannot be taken as universal there are plenty of examples evident
in the creation of ICADPs at Kamiali, Crater Mountain and Lak (Johnson, 1997; Majid-Cooke,
1997; Martin, 1999).
A major point being made is that the functional strategies of the facilitators, supported and
encouraged by external donors, can be at odds with the behaviours of local landowners.  Attempts
to minimize risk by encouraging representative (functional) groupings can generate increased risk
due to the competitive (territorial) behaviours of local people.  In general, insufficient consideration
is given to strategies which are complementary with the worldviews of locals.  There is evidence
that this may be changing with experience although there are also indicators that functionality still
overrides the territorial context in the statements of influential people.
Conclusions
The ICADPs at Crater Mountain and Kamiali have had a measure of success, albeit with
accompanying difficulties.  The lack of success of the Lak ICADP has led to a form of community
entry that has emphasized a territorial approach in another ICADP at Bismarck-Ramu.  Experience
in a number of combined conservation and development attempts suggest that there are
considerable problems associated with creating a functioning management body inclusive of the
disparate clans and tribes of the designated conservation area, especially within the timelines shaped
by access to financial aid. This has been the case at Crater Mountain ( Pearl, 1994; Johnson, 1997),
Lasanga Island - Lake Trist (Martin and Taylor, 1993), Lakekamu - Kunimaipa Basin (Pupang,
1996) and Kikori River Basin (Naug, pers. comm. 24/9/96).
The way in which Crater Mountain and Kamiali have developed suggests the possibility of a
‘territorial’ strategy being appropriate in some circumstances.  In both of these cases elements
consistent with a territorial approach can be discerned.  It must be noted, however, that this has not
been by design but rather has arisen by circumstance.  In the case of Crater Mountain, interest in
conservation was initially confined to the village of Ubaigubi and other villages were added to the
group over time.  Eventually some of these dropped out, leaving four villages to allocate land to the
Wildlife Management area.  While there is a single management committee the literature suggests
that each village works relatively independently of the others.  The development of a functional
management committee for the WMA has developed only gradually over time.
The Kamiali ICAD project arose out of the inability of a large conservation concept (Lasanga
Island-Lake Trist) to obtain support from outside donor organisations.  The resultant, greatly
diminished, area contains only one village, one tribal group, two clans and 12 kinship or subclan
groups all of which have a long history of relative co-operation.  In Crater Mountain and Kamiali
conflict situations have been common, both within each area’s population as attempts were made to
reach consensus positions in regard to numbers of issues, and as they have interacted with outside
facilitators.  What is significant is that despite this both have achieved the declaration of a Wildlife
Management Area and show evidence of improved cash income since they entered into partnership
with conservation oriented change agents.  They also show no sign in the short to intermediate
term of succumbing to outside pressures for large-scale exploitation of their resources (recognising
that these outside pressures are of a limited nature, especially in the case of the Kamiali).  The
suggestion being made is that the processes involved in the creation of these ICAD projects, along
with certain chance events and natural biophysical conditions, have articulated with the territorial
perspectives of the local people.
Limited options for the sale or ‘rent’ of their natural resources have provided the conditions in
which the Kamiali ICAD project has essentially been confined to one ‘territory’.  The WMA itself is
only 47,413 ha. of which 29,285 ha. is forest. This is well below the size necessary to ensure the
long-term viability of ecosystems according to knowledgeable sources working in Melanesia
(Alcorn, 1993; James, 1996).   To extend the scope of the present WMA at Kamiali requires the co-
operation and agreement of surrounding village groups rather than clan groups.  Given past
9practice, and the views of what constitutes an appropriately sized area of conservation by groups
donating money or organisational skills, it could be expected that a functional approach would be
attempted.  This involves putting together a representative management committee of the disparate
groups concerned and accepting the inevitable competition, jealousies, disputes and uncertainty this
entails.  On the other hand, a territorial approach would involve adding ‘independent’ territorial
units and integrating these as, and when, social conditions allow.
A territorial approach can allow for some differentiation of development and a tolerance of a
degree of inequity that would not be countenanced by some of the groups in ‘partnership’.  Such
differences are likely, in the short term at least, as there are limited opportunities for income
generation in the area. If conservation-oriented facilitators are to support individual ‘territories’
defined by coherent landowning groups (in this case mostly of village size) then they would have to
be prepared for the risk and uncertainty involved in trying to put together conservation areas as
amalgams of these territories.  The current practice, in virtually every case, has been to assess an
area for its biodiversity values and then, if criteria are met, to attempt to create a single management
unit representative of the territorial groups owning land in the area.  Facilitators are looking for
some security that their resources are going into a biodiverse area of viable size.  However, it is
doubtful that the risks involved in a ‘territorial’ approach would be any greater than apply at
present.  The lessons so far are that such single management units are rarely coherent and that the
uncertainties and distrust displayed by the members in dealing with people of other tribal or clan
groups is a significant factor affecting the chances of survival of the conservation area.  By dealing
with territorial groups independently of each other the uncertainties of the people within each
group could be lessened.  As opportunities based in mutual benefit arose for integration of these
groups then those opportunities should be exploited.  Overall, the combined levels of risk and
uncertainty in the area containing the biodiversity values should be reduced and the longer term aim
of their maintenance enhanced. There would be a shift in the perceived distribution of risk and
uncertainty from local landowners to the external donor agencies.  It must be reiterated that such a
strategy will not be appropriate in all situations.  However, it has possibilities in the area of the
Morobe Southeast coast and other similar areas may also be amenable to such a strategy.
The idea of a large Wildlife Management Area or Conservation Zone obtaining greater protection
through agreements among the landowning groups of the area providing pressure on individual
groups to work within common sets of rules need not be lost.  However, it should not be expected
in the short to medium-term.  Many years may pass before functional links between groups provide
sufficient incentive for such agreements and joint decision-making structures to eventuate.  Those
functional links will tend to weaken the territorial perspectives of the landowning groups and arise
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